















We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets 
where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function. We 
argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by 
ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium 
matching function has decreasing returns to scale – where the “Hosios rule” does not 
apply – both with and without heterogeneity. This wage determination mechanism is 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent  developments  in  search  theory  have  uncovered  a  very  simple 
coordination  problem  from  which  a  matching  function  emerges  as  an  equilibrium 
phenomenon.  In  particular,  when  sellers  have  a  fixed  amount  to  sell,  and  buyers 
choose which seller to approach, many asymmetric pure strategy equilibria exist, but 
only one symmetric equilibrium exists. In this symmetric equilibrium, buyers play 
mixed strategies and randomise over sellers. The randomisation implies a matching 
process, which has many natural properties that are similar to those imposed in the 
standard  labour  matching  literature  (Pissarides  (2000)).  For  example,  in  large 
economies,  in  the  limit,  the  equilibrium  matching  function  from  the  coordination 
problem exhibits constant returns to scale – consistent with the assumption that is 
usually made. However, in any economy of finite size, the coordination equilibrium 
matching function has decreasing returns to scale: the coordination problem worsens 
as the scale of the market increases. This idea has been explored in papers by, among 
others, Julien, Kennes and King (2000), and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
1  
 
This has implications for the efficiency of the equilibria considered.
2 In the 
context of the standard matching environment, Hosios (1990) argued that efficiency is 
possible  only  if  the  matching  function  has  constant  returns  to  scale.  Under  these 
conditions, efficiency is obtained if and only if the “Hosios Rule” holds: the share of 
the surplus going to agents (i.e., either workers or vacancies) equals their marginal 
contribution to matches. In that environment, with homogeneous agents, there is no 
reason why this condition should hold. However, as is now well known, this condition 
                                                 
1 Earlier work by Peters (1984) and Montgomery (1991) considered equilibria in capacity-constrained 
environments such as this without drawing out the  implications for the matching function. Other recent 
papers that have explored this link are Shi (2001), and Shimer (2001). Recently, this type of model has 
been  classified  as  “directed  search”.  The  class  of  directed  search  models  is  larger  than  the  class 
considered, in this paper, where a coordination problem lies at the heart of the matching process. For 
example, Moen (1997) presents a directed search environment with many locations and a matching 
function at each location. There, search is “directed” in the sense that workers can choose locations, but 
“undirected” in the sense that workers face random assignment once reaching any particular location.  
2 In this literature, it has become conventional to examine whether or not equilibrium allocations are 
“constrained efficient” – that is, efficient given the friction associated with the matching function. In 
this paper, for the most part, we follow that tradition. Thus, whenever we use the word “efficient” we 
intend for the reader to understand that we mean “constrained efficient” in that sense.   2
is always satisfied in the coordination equilibrium environment in the limiting case 
when the market is large.
3  
 
When  agents  are  heterogeneous,  in  the  standard  matching  environment, 
Acemoglu (2001), Davis (2001), and Sargent and Ljungquist (2000) point out that, 
even in the presence of constant returns to scale in the matching function, an efficient 
allocation is simply not possible – that is, the Hosios Rule cannot be satisfied for all 
agents using a single matching technology. However, the equilibrium is efficient in 
large market models with heterogeneity, and coordination equilibrium matching (Shi 
(2001), Kennes, King, and Julien (2001)).  
 
  When  the  market  is  large,  then,  the  coordination  equilibrium  matching 
function has constant returns to scale and the equilibrium allocations are efficient – 
either with or without the presence of heterogeneity. However, when the market has a 
finite size, the equilibrium matching function has decreasing returns to scale and the 
allocations are not efficient  in the coordination  equilibria  considered so  far  in the 
literature.  
 
  In  this  paper,  we  argue  that  the  inefficiency  of  coordination  equilibria  in 
markets  of  finite  size  hinges  crucially  on  the  particular  wage  determination 
mechanisms  that  have  been  used  in  the  literature  so  far.  Following  Montgomery 
(1991), most models have assumed that wages are posted, and committed to, ex ante 
(that is, before the candidates and vacancies have been matched). In Julien, Kennes, 
and King (2000), we considered a similar mechanism but where reserve wages were 
committed to ex ante, while actual wages were determined ex post by a bidding game. 
We show here that if wages are determined entirely by ex post bidding, without any ex 
ante commitment to either wages or reserve wages, (that is, there is no reserve beyond 
the outside option) then allocations in coordination equilibria are always efficient – 
with or without heterogeneity, and even in finite-sized markets.  
 
                                                 
3 See Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) and Shi (2001). Equilibrium allocations tend to be efficient more 
generally  in  large  directed  search  economies.  See,  for  example,  Moen  (1997)  and  Acemoglu  and 
Shimer (2000).   3
We also note the resemblance between this wage determination mechanism 
and  the  rule  proposed  by  Mortensen  (1982)  in  the  context of  random  search.  He 
suggested a sharing rule that could be conditioned on the actions of the participants in 
the search process: at the local level (i.e., at the level of individual matches) the agent 
who “initiates” the match should be awarded the entire surplus. In the economies that 
we consider here, the buyers choose which seller to purchase from, and workers play 
the role of sellers of labour. Thus, buyers “initiate” the match. Mortensen’s rule was 
devised with bilateral matches as the only possibility. When matches are bilateral in 
our  framework, the buyers are  indeed awarded all of the surplus  from the  match. 
However, when matches are not bilateral, (i.e., when more than one buyer approaches 
a seller) then buyers compete in a bidding game. In this case, the role of initiator, ex 
post, switches to the seller.
4 
 
  Since, in these finite-sized environments, the matching process has decreasing 
returns to scale, the Hosios rule does not apply, while the Mortensen rule does apply 
for efficiency. However, as market size increases, in the limit, the matching process 
approaches constant returns to scale, and both the Mortensen and Hosios rules apply. 
In this limit, also, the equilibrium expected payoffs under the three different wage 
determination  mechanisms  (wage  posting,  reserve  wage  posting,  ex  post  bidding) 
converge. Thus, for any finite-sized market, the ex post bidding allocation is always 
efficient and, the larger the market, the closer the equilibrium allocations of the other 
two mechanisms come to this allocation.  
 
  Following the literature, we consider efficiency along two different margins, 
which  are  conceptually  quite  distinct.  The  first  margin  is  the  one  that  is  most 
commonly considered: whether or not the entry decision by agents is efficient. The 
second  margin  was  considered  by  Montgomery  (1991),  when  studying  seller 
heterogeneity: given a fixed number of buyers and sellers, do the equilibrium prices 
induce visit probabilities that maximize expected aggregate surplus? These issues are 
covered under alternative heterogeneity conditions: homogeneity on both sides of the 
market,  one-sided  heterogeneity  on  either  side  of  the  market,  and  two-sided 
heterogeneity.  
                                                 
4 Hosios (1990) also notes that Mortensen’s rule can be interpreted as an auction.   4
  In the case of two-sided heterogeneity we also find that, under fairly general 
conditions, with the ex post bidding mechanism, the mixed strategy equilibrium at the 
heart of the coordination matching approach does exist. This contrasts with earlier 
work by Coles and Eeckhout (1999) who show that this equilibrium does not exist for 
other  mechanisms.  In  particular,  the  standard  assumption  of  supermodularity  in 
production is sufficient to rule out the mixing equilibrium for the mechanisms they 
consider, but not for this mechanism. The mixing equilibrium exists as long as the 
surplus from the best possible match is no larger than the sum of the surpluses from 
the next two best matches.  
   
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the basic 
model  with  finite  numbers  of  homogeneous  agents.  Section  three  then  introduces 
heterogeneity. We consider three different cases: one-sided heterogeneity (for both 
sides of the market) with arbitrary numbers of agents, and two-sided heterogeneity 
with two agents on each side of the market. In section four we present our conclusions 
and some discussion. 
 
 
2.  THE BASIC MODEL WITH HOMOGENOUS AGENTS 
 
The  assignment  game  is  standard  with  2 ³ M   identical  vacancies  and  2 ³ N  
identical candidates. Here, workers sell, and firms buy, labour. To keep the analysis 
simple, we assume that each firm has one vacancy to fill, and refer to a firm as a 
vacancy. The productivity of a worker is  0 0 = y  if unemployed, and  0 1 > = y y  if 
employed. In all cases, we assume that all workers use identical selling mechanisms.  
 
2.1  Wage Determination (Ex Post Bidding) 
 
We assume here that pricing (the wage) is determined by ex post bidding. That is to 
say we assume that workers cannot commit to wages, or reserve wages, above their 
outside options. In this case the bidding game determines that the firm extracts all the 
surplus if she is alone in her offer to the worker and the worker extracts all the surplus   5
if there are multiple offers.
5 Let  j w  denote the payoff received by a worker whose 
second best alternative has productivity  j y . If the worker is employed, this payoff is 
his wage. Otherwise, the payoff is simply his productivity when unemployed (which 
we have normalized to zero). For  } 1 , 0 { Î j , we have: 
 
                                                                 j j y w =                                                      (2.1) 
  
Thus, if a worker receives exactly one offer, his wage is  0 0 0 = = y w , and if a worker 
receives two or more offers his wage is  y y w = = 1 1 . Notice, also, that ex post, a 
vacancy will receive the payoff y if she is alone when approaching a candidate, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
2.2  Equilibrium Vacancy Assignment 
 
Each vacancy chooses which candidate to visit, in order to maximize her expected 
payoff. Let 
m
n p  denote the probability that vacancy m approaches candidate n, and let 
m
n V   denote  the  expected  payoff  for  vacancy  m  if  she  visits  candidate  n.  In  the 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium  n
m
n p p =  and  n
m
n V V =  for all  M m ,..., 2 , 1 = . 
Since  each  vacancy  receives  y  if  alone  when  approaching  a  worker  and  zero 
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5 This scheme is not as extreme as it may sound. In a dynamic game, the outside option is the value of 
playing the game in the next period, which is not zero. In Kennes, King, and Julien (2001), we consider 
a calibrated example, where the length of a period is one week. In the stationary  equilibrium, the 
weekly  wage  of a  worker who receives only  one offer is $127, while the wage  of a  worker who 
receives multiple offers from the same type of job is $150. (Two types of jobs exist in that model, and 
the figures reported here are from low productivity jobs.)    6
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, each vacancy selects  i p  and  j p  so that 
 
j i V V =     } ,..., 2 , 1 { , N j i Î "   
 








1 p    one obtains: 
 
                                                               N / 1 = p                                                      (2.2) 
 
and the expected number of matches (or the "matching function") is given by: 
 
                                               ( ) ) / 1 1 1 ( ) , (
M N N M N x - - =                                      (2.3) 
 
This matching function has decreasing returns to scale but, in the limit when M and N 
are large, has constant returns to scale. Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of 
this function, for N = 2, 3, …, 30  and M = 2, 3, …, 30. 
 
Figure 1: The Equilibrium Matching Function 
 
  We  can  now  completely  characterize  the  expected  payoff  distribution  for 
workers. Let  0 p  denote the probability that a worker receives no offers, (and so, is 
unemployed)  1 p   the  probability  that  he  receives  exactly  one  offer,  and  2 p   the 
probability that he receives at least two offers. The workers’ payoff distribution is 
given by: 
   7
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For vacancies, let  0 r  and  0 q denote the ex post payoff and probability, respectively, of 
being alone when approaching a worker. Let  1 r  and  1 q  denote these figures when at 
least one other firm approaches the worker. The payoff distribution for a firm in this 
game is given by: 
 





































                              (2.5) 
 
In the absence of endogenous entry, equations (2.4) and (2.5) fully characterize the 
equilibrium expected payoffs of the model. In Section 2.4, below, we consider the 
firms’  entry  decision.  Before  that,  however,  we  can  ask  whether  or  not  this 
equilibrium wage distribution is efficient in the following sense: given the numbers of 
vacancies  and  candidates,  and  that  vacancies  randomise  in  equilibrium,  do  they 
choose the probabilities that maximize total expected output? 
   8
2.3  Efficient Assignment with Fixed Numbers of Agents 
 
Given M and N, for each vacancy m and worker n, consider a planner that chooses the 
visit probabilities  ) 1 , 0 ( Î
m
n p  to maximize total expected output: 
 





















1 p       = "m  1, 2, … , M 
Clearly,  to  achieve  this  objective,  the  planner  will  choose  the  ) 1 , 0 ( Î
m
n p   that 
minimizes expected unemployment: 
 





















1 p       = "m  1, 2, … , M       (2.6) 
 
This is precisely the “classical occupancy problem”. The following theorem is simply 
a restatement of a well-known result in probability theory. 
 
Proposition 1:  Given any finite number M of homogenous vacancies, and N 
homogeneous  candidates,  the  symmetric  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  with  ex  post 
bidding maximizes total expected output. 
 
Proof: Solving the minimization problem in (2.6), one obtains (2.2). 
 
 
2.4  Vacancy Entry 
 
Suppose now that, given the number (N) of workers, and given a fixed entry cost 
0 > k  for each vacancy, firms can choose the number of vacancies to create. The 
equilibrium number of vacancies is determined by the zero profit free entry condition. 
Proposition 2 summarizes the main result in this section of the paper. 
 
Proposition 2:  Given  any  finite  number  N  of  homogeneous  candidates, 
equilibrium entry of homogenous vacancies is efficient.  
   9
Proof: It is sufficient to show that, in equilibrium, the marginal private benefit of a 
new vacancy equals the marginal social benefit of a new vacancy. Using (2.5), if there 
are N candidates and M  vacancies, the expected payoff  for a  new  vacancy  in the 
auction equilibrium is given by: 
                                            k
N
N












) , (                                    (2.7) 
 
At the aggregate level, expected output in a market with M vacancies is given by: 
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Expected aggregate output with M-1 buyers is given by: 
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The marginal social benefit of an additional vacancy is given by 
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2.5  A Digression: Reserve Wages and Wage Posting 
 
At this point, it is worthwhile to contrast these results with those using alternative 
wage determination mechanisms. For example, in Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), 
candidates auction their labor in the same way as above, but can commit to a reserve 
wage. In Montgomery (1991) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), wages are posted 
and committed to. In each of these environments, the unique symmetric equilibrium 
has  all  buyers  randomising  and  visiting  each  seller  with  equal  probability.  Thus,   10
equation  (2.1)  holds  in  all  cases  and,  by  the  analysis  of  Section  2.3,  given  fixed 
numbers of candidates and vacancies, buyers are efficiently assigned. 
 
  When  considering  vacancy  entry  with  finite  numbers  of  players,  however, 
Julien,  Kennes,  and  King  (2000)  show  that  too  few  vacancies  are  created  in 
equilibrium.  Although  neither  Montgomery  (1991)  nor  Burdett,  Shi,  and  Wright 
(2001)  consider  entry  under  these  conditions,  it  is  straightforward  to  do.
6  When 
candidates commit to a posted wage then, from Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), the 
equilibrium wage is: 
 








































=                        (2.10) 
 
In this case, the expected payoff to a vacancy is given by: 
 
                                 ( )( ) k M N w y N
M
N
N M B P
M
P - - - - = ) , ( ) / 1 1 ( 1 ) , (              (2.11) 
 
















Figure 2: Inefficiency of Entry with Wage Posting 
                                                 
6 This set-up is slightly different from the one studied by Montgomery (1991) and Burdett, Shi, and 
Wright (2001): the roles of workers and vacancies, as buyers and sellers, have been reversed. That is, in 
the Montgomery and Burdett et al papers, firms sell jobs. Here, workers sell labour. For the qualitative 
point that we make in this subsection, this distinction is irrelevant.    11
Figure 2 shows that, in any finite market, the private benefit from creating a 
new vacancy is always less than the social benefit – thus, as with auctioning with a 
reserve wage, too few vacancies are created in equilibrium. However, it is also clear 
from Figure 2 that this difference will be small for any significant size of the market.  
 
 
3.  HETEROGENEITY 
 
We  now  extend  the  basic  model  by  allowing  for  heterogeneity  among  agents. 
Specifically,  we  consider  three  different  models,  with  different  degrees  of 
heterogeneity.  First,  we  consider  heterogeneous  candidates  facing  homogenous 
vacancies,  then  homogenous  candidates  facing  heterogeneous  vacancies,  then 
equilibria with  heterogeneity on  both sides of the  market. In each case, as  in the 
model with homogeneous agents, each candidate has one unit of labour to sell. Also, 
wages are determined by ex post bidding. 
 
3.1  Heterogeneous Candidates with Homogeneous Vacancies 
 
We start, as in Section 2 above, with M identical existing vacancies. Also, there are N 
candidates.  However,  the  productivity  of  each  candidate  is  unique,  and  these 
productivities can be ranked: 
 
                                                         N y y y < < < ... 2 1                                            (3.1.1) 
 
Since vacancies are homogeneous, for each one, the payoff from visiting any of the 
candidates is either the whole surplus  i y  if they are alone or 0 if not (due to the 
bidding  structure).  As  before,  let 
m
n p   denote  the  probability  that  vacancy  m 
approaches candidate n and let 
m
n V  denote the expected payoff for vacancy m if she 
visits candidate n. In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium  n
m
n p p =  and  n
m
n V V =  




i i y V
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- - = p    12
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In the mixed strategy equilibrium, each vacancy selects  i p  and  j p  so that 
 
































i j p p , one obtains 
 


























































p    N i ,..., 2 , 1 = "                   (3.1.2) 
 
Equation (3.1.2) presents the equilibrium visit probabilities, for each candidate. We 
now  consider  the  planner’s  problem  with  a  fixed  M.  The  planner  chooses  visit 
probabilities  ) 1 , 0 ( Î
m
n p  to maximize total expected output: 
 





























1 p       = "m  1, 2, … , M.      (3.1.3) 
 
Proposition 3:  Given any finite number M of homogenous vacancies, and N 
heterogeneous  candidates  ordered  as  in  (3.1.1),  the  symmetric  mixed  strategy 
equilibrium with ex post bidding maximizes total expected output. 
 
Proof: Performing the maximization problem in (3.1.3), one obtains (3.1.2).
Z  
   13
This result contrasts with those in models with wage posting. For example, in 
the two-by-two case with one-sided heterogeneity, Montgomery (1991) shows that the 
equilibrium is inefficient. However, with auction and reserve prices, again in the two-
by-two case, Julien, Kennes and King (2002) demonstrate efficiency. It is also worth 
pointing out that, while the visit probabilities in (3.1.2) maximize expected output for 
the market, they do not minimize unemployment. As in the homogeneous agent case, 
unemployment is minimized when the visit probabilities and simply  N / 1 . Thus, as 
Montgomery  noted,  from  a  policy  point  of  view,  in  the  face  of  this  type  of 
heterogeneity,  a  potential  trade-off  exists  if  policymakers  wish  to  both  maximize 




We now consider whether or not the entry decision by vacancies is efficient. As in 
Section  2,  we  consider  a  fixed  entry  cost  k  >  0,  and  the  equilibrium  number  of 
vacancies  is  determined  by  the  zero  profit  free  entry  condition.  The  following 
proposition summarizes the main result. 
 
Proposition 4:  Given  N  candidates  with  productivities  ordered  in  (3.1.1), 
equilibrium entry of homogenous vacancies is efficient. 
 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that, in equilibrium, the marginal private benefit of a 
new vacancy equals the marginal social benefit of a new vacancy. 
 
In equilibrium, due to the bidding structure, vacancies receive positive payoffs ex post 
if and only if they are alone when they approach a candidate. With M vacancies, the 
equilibrium expected marginal private benefit is given by: 
                                        
[
=




n n n k y M MPB
1
1 ) 1 ( ) ( p p                               (3.1.4) 
 
where  n p  is given in (3.1.2) for  . ,..., 2 , 1 N n =  
   14
At the aggregate level, expected net output in a market with M vacancies is given by: 
 















= = 1 1
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where  n p  is given in (3.1.2) for  . ,..., 2 , 1 N n =  This can be re-written as: 
 





n - - - =
c
=1
1 1 ) ( p                               (3.1.5) 
 
Similarly, with M-1 vacancies: 
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p                        (3.1.6) 
 
Using (3.1.5) and (3.1.6), the expected marginal social benefit of the Mth vacancy is 
therefore given by: 
 
              ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
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3.2  Homogeneous Candidates with Heterogeneous Vacancies 
 
Suppose now there are N identical candidates, and M vacancies, where each vacancy 
has a different productivity level, and these levels are ranked as follows: 
 
                                                       M y y y < < < ... 2 1                                             (3.2.1) 
 
Using  the  convention  adopted  in  Section  2,  let  0 y   denote  the  productivity  of  a 
candidate when unemployed. We normalize so that  1 0 0 y y < = . As before, let  j w  
denote the payoff received by a worker whose second best alternative has productivity 
j y . Due to the bidding game, ex post, For  } ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 { M jÎ , we have: 
 
                                                                 j j y w =                                                   (3.2.2) 
 
  Again, let 
m
n p  denote the probability that vacancy m approaches candidate n 
and let 
m
n V  denote the expected payoff for vacancy m if she visits candidate n. Given 
the bidding outcome in (3.2.2), we can write these expected payoffs in the following 
way: 
 
) )]( 1 )...( 1 ( [ )] 1 )...( 1 )( 1 [( 1
1 2 1 1 2 1 y y y V M
M




n - - - + - - - =
- - p p p p p p  









n n n y y y y p p p p  
 
) )]( 1 )...( 1 ( [ )] 1 )...( 1 )( 1 [( 1 1
2 1
1
2 1 1 y y y V M
M




n - - - + - - - = - -
- p p p p p p  










n n n y y y y p p p p  






3 2 1 ) 1 )...( 1 )( 1 ( y V
M
n n n n p p p - - - =                               N n ,..., 2 , 1 = "                      (3.2.3) 
 
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, each vacancy m chooses 
m
n p  so that: 




i V V =            } ,..., 2 , 1 { , N j i Î "  
 
This then implies: 
m m
n p p =             N n ,..., 2 , 1 = "  
 
That is, each vacancy assigns equal weight to each candidate. Hence: 
 
                   N
m
n / 1 = =p p             M m ,..., 2 , 1 = "   and   N n ,..., 2 , 1 = "                 (3.2.4) 
 
Equation (3.2.4) presents the equilibrium  visit probabilities.  We  now consider the 
planner’s  problem,  choosing  these  probabilities,  given  a  fixed  number  N  of 
candidates, and given the vacancies in (3.2.1). 
The planner chooses  ) 1 , 0 ( Î
m
n p  to maximize total output: 
 




































1 p      = "m  1, 2, … , M      (3.2.5) 
 
Proposition 5:  Given any finite number N of homogeneous candidates and M 
vacancies ordered as in (3.2.1), the mixed strategy equilibrium with ex post bidding 
maximizes total expected output. 
 
Proof:   Solving the maximization problem in (3.2.5), one obtains (3.2.4).  
o    
 
  Notice that, in this case, since each vacancy approaches each candidate with 
equal probability, the unemployment rate is minimized in equilibrium. That is, in this 
setting, there is no potential policy trade-off between maximizing expected output and 
minimizing  unemployment  –  as  there  was  in  Section  3.1  with  heterogeneous 
candidates. This also implies the following corollary.  
   17
Corollary:  In a game with fixed numbers of buyers and sellers, and heterogeneity 
on  only  one  side  of  the  market,  expected  output  is  higher  if  the  agents  on  the 




Suppose now that the creation of each vacancy has an associated cost. That is, let  m k  
denote the fixed cost of creating vacancy m. Once again, the equilibrium number of 
vacancies is determined by the zero profit free entry condition. We have the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 6:  Given N homogeneous candidates, and potential vacancies with 
productivities  ordered  as  in  (3.2.1),  where  each  vacancy  m  has  fixed  cost  m k , 
equilibrium entry of these vacancies is efficient. 
 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that, in equilibrium, the marginal private benefit of a 
new vacancy equals its marginal social benefit 
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Re-arranging this, we get: 
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M k y y M MPB p p                      (3.2.6) 
 
At the aggregate level, using (3.2.4) in (3.2.5), expected net output with M vacancies 
is given by: 
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Similarly, with M-1 vacancies: 
 





















M k y y M Y p                       (3.2.8) 
 
Using (3.2.7) and (3.2.8), the expected marginal social benefit of the Mth vacancy is 
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Re-arranging, and using (3.2.6), we get: 
 
= - - = ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( M Y M Y M MSB ) ( ) 1 (
1
1









- - p p  
 
Using entirely analogous arguments, it is straightforward to show that this result holds 
for vacancies 1, 2, …  M-1 when considered as marginal vacancies.          
v  
 
This  result  is  very  different  from  those  derived  in  the  standard  matching 
function literature. For example, Sargent and Ljungquist (2000), Acemoglu (2001), 
and  Davis  (2001)  argue  that  efficient  entry  is  impossible  in  the  presence  of 
heterogeneous vacancies, using the standard sharing rule – even in large markets. In 
their  environment,  the  matching  technology  has  more  than  two  arguments.  This 
implies  that  the  elasticity  condition  of  the  Hosios  rule  is  no  longer  applicable. 
Essentially, there then exist three dimensions on which entry is determined – entry of 
good jobs, entry of bad jobs, and an extra externality concerning the composition of 
good  and  bad  jobs  in  the  market.  Thus  a  sharing  rule  cannot  generate  a  socially 
efficient outcome. What we have shown here is that the socially efficient outcome 
will be obtained, even in small markets, if wages are determined by ex post bidding. 
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3.3  Two-Sided Heterogeneity 
 
We now consider allocations in the presence of heterogeneity on both sides of the 
market.  Here,  we  restrict  attention  to  the  setting  with  two  candidates  and  two 
vacancies. Let 
m
n y  denote the surplus of the match between vacancy m and candidate 
n,  for  } 2 , 1 { , Î n m .  As  before,  0 y   denotes  the  payoff,  to  the  candidate,  when 
unemployed. Without loss of generality, we assume: 
 








1 0 , 0 y y y y y £ £ £ =                                   (3.3.1) 
 
The  ex  post  bidding  game  implies  the  following  payoff  matrix  for  the  vacancies, 
according to their choices of candidate to approach: 
 
   Vacancy 2 
    Candidate 1  Candidate 2 




1 y y -               
1
1 y   ,  
2
2 y  
  Candidate 2                
1
2 y ,  
2
















2 y y y + >   then  there  exists  a  unique  Nash  equilibrium.  In  this 
equilibrium  both  vacancies play pure strategies  and the assignment has 
positive assortative matching. 
 






2 y y y + £  then three Nash equilibria exist: 
 
i)  A pure strategy equilibrium with positive assortative matching. 
ii)  A pure strategy equilibrium with negative assortative matching. 
iii)  A mixed strategy equilibrium in which: 
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= p                                           (3.3.2) 
 










= p                                                (3.3.3) 
 
Proof: Parts (a) and (b(i),(ii)) are clear  from  inspection of the normal  form game 
presented in Table 1. To prove part (b(iii)), let 
m
n V  denote the expected payoff for 






































2 y y y V - - + = p p  
 








1 V V =  we then obtain the result.   
w  
 
  Part (a) of the above proposition states that, if the surplus associated with the 
best match is greater than the aggregate surplus of the next two best matches, then 
there will be no coordination problem in this market because there is only one Nash 
equilibrium. Moreover, in this equilibrium, vacancies play pure strategies, there is 
positive assortative matching and, from a surplus-maximizing perspective, the first-
best allocation is achieved. This result is very similar to the one found in Coles and 
Eeckhout (1999), which they interpret as “heterogeneity as a coordination device”.  
 
  However, there are some key differences between the results found here and 
those  found  by  Coles  and  Eeckhout.  First, they  find  that  restricting  the  matching 
process  to  be  strictly  supermodular  is  sufficient  to  ensure  the  uniqueness  of  the 
equilibrium identified in part (a). In this setting, however, strict supermodularity is not 
sufficient to obtain this result. To see this, note that, here, the matching process is 
strictly supermodular if and only if: 
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2 y y y y y y + < < - +  
 
where  matching  is  supermodular,  by  (3.3.4).  Also,  strict  supermodularity  is  not 
necessary for the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium with positive assortative 
matching – as is clear from part (b) of Proposition 7. However, as should be clear, 
strict supermodularity is necessary for the uniqueness of that equilibrium.  
 
Overall, then, the condition for heterogeneity to act as a coordination device 
(that is, to narrow down the number of equilibria to one in this type of setting) is 
stronger than the supermodular condition given by Coles and Eeckhout. While the 
supermodular condition is a common and fairly natural one to impose on a matching 
process, the stronger condition in part (a) of Proposition 7 is relatively extreme. Thus, 
the  mixed strategy equilibrium, characterized  in part (b) of the Proposition, exists 
fairly  generally  in  these  settings  with  two-sided  heterogeneity.  Also,  this  mixed 
strategy equilibrium is the analogue of the mixed strategy equilibrium studied in the 
cases when one side of the market is homogeneous (above). As with all of the mixed 
strategy equilibria, the allocation is not efficient (first-best). However, we can once 
again ask whether or not this equilibrium is constrained efficient in the usual way. 
 
Proposition 8:  Wherever  it  exists,  the  mixed  strategy  equilibrium 
characterized in Proposition 7 is constrained efficient. 
 
Proof: The constrained planner chooses  ) 1 , 0 ( Î
m
n p  to maximize: 
 




















1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( y y y y Y p p p p p p - + - + + - =              (3.3.5) 
 
  Solving this maximization problem, one obtains (3.3.2) and (3.3.3).             
x  
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As in all previous settings, then, given that vacancies randomise over workers, 
the mixed strategy equilibrium selects the visit probabilities that maximize expected 
surplus. One could argue, though, that the justification for focussing on the mixed 
strategy equilibrium is less compelling in this setting than in the others. First, this 






2 y y y + £  holds. Second, even when 
this condition holds, (and so there is a coordination problem) there exists a unique 
Pareto dominant pure strategy equilibrium (with positive assortative matching). Using 
the traditional criteria for equilibrium selection in this case, one would not single out 
the mixed strategy equilibrium.  
 
Fine and Coarse Heterogeneity 
 
  In this section, so far, the heterogeneity that we have considered has  been 
quite fine: the surplus of each match can be entirely specific to the individual agents 
being matched. From sections 2, 3.1 and 3.2, we know that homogeneity on either 
side of the market ensures the existence of the mixed strategy equilibrium. This can 
also be seen by imposing restrictions on two-sided heterogeneity game in this section 






















2 y y y + > .  
 
  While  one-sided  homogeneity  is  sufficient  for  the  existence  of  the  mixed 
strategy  equilibrium,  this  degree  of  coarseness  is  not  necessary.  For  example,  if 










2 y y y + > . Similarly, if Candidates 1 and 2 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We argue here that, when the matching process is generated by the simple 
coordination problem, the equilibrium will be efficient if wages are determined by ex 
post bidding (or, the “Mortensen Rule”), regardless of the size of the market. This 
result holds both with homogeneous agents and with different types of heterogeneity. 
In limit large markets, with homogeneous agents on both sides of the market, the 
expected payoffs determined by this rule are identical to those determined by auctions 
with reserve wages (as in Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) and by wage posting (as in 
Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). However, in markets of finite size, these payoffs do 
not coincide and only the payoffs determined by ex post bidding are efficient.  
 
The concept of efficiency that we used here is that of constrained-efficiency: 
when  the  planner  can  influence  incentives,  but  cannot  eliminate  the  coordination 
problem. We considered efficiency along two separate margins: when the number of 
agents is given and the visit probabilities are to be determined, and when the both the 
entry of vacancies and the visit probabilities are to be determined. We also considered 
different degrees of heterogeneity. We found that, in all cases considered, when the 
numbers of agents are given, the ex post bidding mixed strategy equilibrium (if it 
exists) implements the constrained-efficient allocation.  
 
Whenever  there  is  homogeneity  on  either  side  of  the  market,  the  ex  post 
bidding  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  does  exist  and,  when  vacancy  entry  is 
endogenous, this equilibrium also implements the constrained-efficient allocation. We 
restricted attention to the cases where, on the heterogeneous side of the market, each 
agent is unique. It is not difficult to show, however, that the results derived here are 
preserved whenever two or more agents on the heterogeneous side of the market are 
identical. 
 
With  two-sided  heterogeneity,  to  keep  the  analysis  tractable,  we  only 
considered the case with two candidates and two vacancies. We showed that, while 
homogeneity on at least one side of the market is sufficient to ensure the existence of 
the mixed strategy equilibrium, it is not necessary. In particular, the mixed strategy 
equilibrium exists if and only if the value of the best match is no greater than the sum   24
of the values of the next two best matches. Thus, the mixed strategy equilibrium is 
eliminated only when the best match is relatively extreme.  
 
Overall,  we  believe  that  the  introduction  of  ex  post  bidding  or,  loosely 
speaking, the Mortensen rule, into the coordination model of unemployment brings 
many advantages. First, as shown here, the equilibrium allocations, when using this 
wage determination mechanism, are typically efficient. Secondly, this is an extremely 
simple rule to use. In particular, relative to the  mechanisms used  in  Montgomery 
(1991), Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), this 
mechanism requires much less computation and since the modeller is not required to 
compute  the  Nash  wage  (or  reserve  wage)  announcements.  For  this  reason,  this 
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